In my last journal
entry, I told you what various sorts of people thought President
Trump meant by the phase "totally destroy North Korea." Then I
raised a question as to "what it all meant." (The question
itself wasn't very specific. I had in mind something like
this: from perusing this "data set" about people's interpretations,
what -- if anything -- can we learn about how people's minds work,
when they think about politics, in general?)
And then I offered an answer to that question ... though I told you at
the time that it wasn't an answer that I actually believed. In
summary, that answer (and my supposed justification for it) was:
- different groups of Trump supporters believed different things
about what he meant;
- but the groups had something in common: what each group believed
(about what Trump meant) matched up with what that same group would
want him to do;
- so -- since the two groups couldn't both be right about what he
meant -- they were not being honest with themselves.
So now, my job is to tell you why I don't really think
that.
Even if that argument did support the conclusion that some people were
not being honest with themselves, it would certainly not support the
conclusion that all of the Trump supporters were guilty of
that. At the very least, it would leave open the possibility
that some of them were, and some of them weren't.
Here's an example. You will recall that my own original
interpretation of Trump's phrase was: the United States would, "
... if forced to defend itself and its allies ...", drop lots of
nuclear bombs on North Korea. Or, as I later crudely put it,
would "nuke the NoKies until they glow." So now -- just
supposing that we still consider that to be the correct
interpretation -- what would follow from that?
Well ... you may also recall that one group of Trump supporters
(namely, most of the people leaving comments on Breitbart News)
interpreted those words of his in exactly the same way that I
did. So were those people failing to be honest with
themselves? Meaning that I believed something because the
evidence supported it, while they believed the same thing for
a completely different reason, namely, because they wanted to believe
it?
That could be so. But "could be" isn't good enough
here. The more appropriate question is: would I have rational
justification for claiming, on the basis of what we've seen, that this
(I and they believing the same thing, but for a completely different
reason) actually is the case?
I think not. I think it would be more plausible (and more
fair-minded) to suppose that, if I have good reasons for believing
something, and they believe the same thing, then they believe it for
good reasons as well.
I do recall that there's one important difference between me and that
group of people: while we both think that Trump (was saying that he)
would drop a lot of nuclear bombs on North Korea, they also approve of
his doing so. And I don't; I find the prospect utterly abhorrent.
But, for present purposes, so what? So their value judgment is
wrong (in my eyes). Does it necessarily follow, even from my
perspective, that they cannot be rational about a related, but still
distinct, matter, namely, about what their president means by what he
says? I don't see why.
If I'm right about that, then we're left, at most, with this:
the other group of Trump supporters are not being honest
with themselves. That would be the group who have a different
belief as to what Trump was talking about; they believe that he was
threatening, at most, some form of military action with more limited
goals, and less devastating effects. Like "mere" regime
change, for instance.
So let's look a little more at that group of people. And let's
continue, for now, simply to assume that my original understanding of
what Trump meant to say (namely, that he was prepared to drop lots of
nukes on the NoKies) was correct.
If my interpretation is [assumed to be] right, and they have a
different interpretation, then their interpretation is wrong.
That, for once, is pretty straightforward. But does it follow
that they are not being honest with themselves?
Not necessarily. It doesn't even necessarily follow that they
are deficient in logic. It could be (and, indeed, it seems more
likely) that they reach a different conclusion because they start with
different premises.
If they and I are getting news from different sources, then they and I
have different sets of facts of which we are aware. This doesn't
necessarily mean that they or I are victims of "fake news," believing
things that are factually false (although that could also be the
case). If each "side" knows things that the other simply doesn't
know, then they can come to different conclusions, with each being
completely rational about it.
How does that apply to the present case: to the question of what
Donald Trump meant by "totally destroy North Korea"? Here's a
simple example. The following are three utterances by Mr. Trump:
"The United States has great strength and patience, but if it
is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but
to totally destroy North Korea."
"Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his
regime."
"North Korea best not make any more threats to the United
States. They will be met with fire and fury like the world has
never seen."
Now imagine two people; call them X and Y. Both of them are
aware of the first quote above. X is aware of the second quote,
but Y is not. Conversely, Y is aware of the third quote, but X
is not.
Other things being equal, I would expect X, who knows about " ... a
suicide mission for himself and for his regime", to be more likely to
think that Trump, in the "totally destroy" sentence, was talking about
regime change. More likely, that is, than Y, who knows, instead,
about "fire and fury."; Y would be more likely to think that Trump was
talking about dropping multiple nuclear bombs.
In that example, the quotes are all real, but you might reasonably
think that the suppositions about what the two people know are not
realistic. You might think, in other words, that almost anyone
who was aware of the first quote would also be at least vaguely aware
of both the second and third, as well.
Fair enough. But now imagine this, instead. X vividly
remembers many times when Trump has seemed to threaten (or favor, or
suggest) violence in various forms. Y, who gets her news from
different sources, has never heard about most of those. Wouldn't
you think, in this case, that X would be readier than Y to hear a
great deal of violence in the words "totally destroy North
Korea"? (Once again, would be readier ... other things being
equal.)
That does seem like a plausible example, doesn't it? I mean,
there at least could be news sources which report extensively
on Trump, but which (for example) focus almost entirely on his more
serious utterances on matters of policy, rather than his off-the-cuff
remarks about punching protesters in the face. So someone who
got her Trump news from sources like that would simply, and
rationally, have a different picture of the man.
And thus, there would be no need to suppose that she was failing to be
honest with herself.
And all this, mind you, is without even considering the possibility
that my [original] interpretation of Trump's infamous remark might
actually be ... gasp ... wrong. Please, don't get me started on
that. Not today, anyway.
In parting, let me go all meta on you for a bit. What is this
journal entry about? About North Korea? Donald
Trump? Well, yes, both. But also ....
Even more fundamentally, I think, it's about two other things.
One of them is generally referred to as "critical thinking." The
other is civility in political discourse: the ability to express
disagreement without impugning the motives of those with whom you
disagree.
And if I had to narrow it down to just one topic, I'd go with critical
thinking. I think that is the foundation which makes civil
discourse possible. If that isn't obvious, consider this: your
ability to do critical thinking is woefully incomplete unless it
includes, in particular, the self-critical
kind.