Oct. 2nd, 2017

In my last journal entry, I told you what various sorts of people thought President Trump meant by the phase "totally destroy North Korea."  Then I raised a question as to "what it all meant."  (The question itself wasn't very specific.  I had in mind something like this: from perusing this "data set" about people's interpretations, what -- if anything -- can we learn about how people's minds work, when they think about politics, in general?)

And then I offered an answer to that question ... though I told you at the time that it wasn't an answer that I actually believed.  In summary, that answer (and my supposed justification for it) was:

  • different groups of Trump supporters believed different things about what he meant;
  • but the groups had something in common: what each group believed (about what Trump meant) matched up with what that same group would want him to do;
  • so -- since the two groups couldn't both be right about what he meant -- they were not being honest with themselves.

So now, my job is to tell you why I don't really think that.

Even if that argument did support the conclusion that some people were not being honest with themselves, it would certainly not support the conclusion that all of the Trump supporters were guilty of that.  At the very least, it would leave open the possibility that some of them were, and some of them weren't.

Here's an example.  You will recall that my own original interpretation of Trump's phrase was: the United States would, " ... if forced to defend itself and its allies ...", drop lots of nuclear bombs on North Korea.  Or, as I later crudely put it, would "nuke the NoKies until they glow."  So now -- just supposing that we still consider that to be the correct interpretation -- what would follow from that?

Well ... you may also recall that one group of Trump supporters (namely, most of the people leaving comments on Breitbart News) interpreted those words of his in exactly the same way that I did.  So were those people failing to be honest with themselves?  Meaning that I believed something because the evidence supported it, while they believed the same thing for a completely different reason, namely, because they wanted to believe it?

That could be so.  But "could be" isn't good enough here.  The more appropriate question is: would I have rational justification for claiming, on the basis of what we've seen, that this (I and they believing the same thing, but for a completely different reason) actually is the case?

I think not.  I think it would be more plausible (and more fair-minded) to suppose that, if I have good reasons for believing something, and they believe the same thing, then they believe it for good reasons as well.

I do recall that there's one important difference between me and that group of people: while we both think that Trump (was saying that he) would drop a lot of nuclear bombs on North Korea, they also approve of his doing so.  And I don't; I find the prospect utterly abhorrent.

But, for present purposes, so what?  So their value judgment is wrong (in my eyes).  Does it necessarily follow, even from my perspective, that they cannot be rational about a related, but still distinct, matter, namely, about what their president means by what he says?  I don't see why.

If I'm right about that, then we're left, at most, with this: the other group of Trump supporters are not being honest with themselves.  That would be the group who have a different belief as to what Trump was talking about; they believe that he was threatening, at most, some form of military action with more limited goals, and less devastating effects.  Like "mere" regime change, for instance.

So let's look a little more at that group of people.  And let's continue, for now, simply to assume that my original understanding of what Trump meant to say (namely, that he was prepared to drop lots of nukes on the NoKies) was correct.

If my interpretation is [assumed to be] right, and they have a different interpretation, then their interpretation is wrong.  That, for once, is pretty straightforward.  But does it follow that they are not being honest with themselves?

Not necessarily.  It doesn't even necessarily follow that they are deficient in logic.  It could be (and, indeed, it seems more likely) that they reach a different conclusion because they start with different premises.

If they and I are getting news from different sources, then they and I have different sets of facts of which we are aware.  This doesn't necessarily mean that they or I are victims of "fake news," believing things that are factually false (although that could also be the case).  If each "side" knows things that the other simply doesn't know, then they can come to different conclusions, with each being completely rational about it.

How does that apply to the present case: to the question of what Donald Trump meant by "totally destroy North Korea"?  Here's a simple example.  The following are three utterances by Mr. Trump:

  1. "The United States has great strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea."

  2. "Rocket Man is on a suicide mission for himself and for his regime."

  3. "North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States.  They will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen."

Now imagine two people; call them X and Y.  Both of them are aware of the first quote above.  X is aware of the second quote, but Y is not.  Conversely, Y is aware of the third quote, but X is not.

Other things being equal, I would expect X, who knows about " ... a suicide mission for himself and for his regime", to be more likely to think that Trump, in the "totally destroy" sentence, was talking about regime change.  More likely, that is, than Y, who knows, instead, about "fire and fury."; Y would be more likely to think that Trump was talking about dropping multiple nuclear bombs.

In that example, the quotes are all real, but you might reasonably think that the suppositions about what the two people know are not realistic.  You might think, in other words, that almost anyone who was aware of the first quote would also be at least vaguely aware of both the second and third, as well.

Fair enough.  But now imagine this, instead.  X vividly remembers many times when Trump has seemed to threaten (or favor, or suggest) violence in various forms.  Y, who gets her news from different sources, has never heard about most of those.  Wouldn't you think, in this case, that X would be readier than Y to hear a great deal of violence in the words "totally destroy North Korea"?  (Once again, would be readier ... other things being equal.)

That does seem like a plausible example, doesn't it?  I mean, there at least could be news sources which report extensively on Trump, but which (for example) focus almost entirely on his more serious utterances on matters of policy, rather than his off-the-cuff remarks about punching protesters in the face.  So someone who got her Trump news from sources like that would simply, and rationally, have a different picture of the man.

And thus, there would be no need to suppose that she was failing to be honest with herself.

And all this, mind you, is without even considering the possibility that my [original] interpretation of Trump's infamous remark might actually be ... gasp ... wrong.  Please, don't get me started on that.  Not today, anyway.

In parting, let me go all meta on you for a bit.  What is this journal entry about?  About North Korea?  Donald Trump?  Well, yes, both.  But also ....

Even more fundamentally, I think, it's about two other things.  One of them is generally referred to as "critical thinking."  The other is civility in political discourse: the ability to express disagreement without impugning the motives of those with whom you disagree.

And if I had to narrow it down to just one topic, I'd go with critical thinking.  I think that is the foundation which makes civil discourse possible.  If that isn't obvious, consider this: your ability to do critical thinking is woefully incomplete unless it includes, in particular, the self-critical kind.


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